Poland 1945-1999: Servility, Misfortune, Liberation

Andrzej Paczkowski

Similarly to the whole of Central Europe, Poland came out of the turmoil of World War II in a devastated and altered state. Owing to the decisions made by the Great Powers, Poland lost half of her territory in the east, from which 1.6 million Poles were deported. ost one sixth of the population perished, the capital was in ruins, the economy was devastated, millions were crippled, disease was rampant, and the intelligentsia was dispersed. For a long time, demographic and economic equilibrium could not be restored in lands granted in the west and the north - whose German population was expelled. Psychological repercussions, characteristic all nations affected by the war, proved to be difficult to overcome. Not only did hatred towards the Germans reach its apogee - just as despised (and feared) were the Russians, regarded as new occupants. Even survivors of the Holocaust were treated with animosity, reinforced by the stereotype of the "Jew-communist". The reason for this attitude lay in the fact that the majority of Poles considered the Deportees from the east abhorred the Ukrainians, who had committed bloody ethnic cleansing among the Poles. imposition of power wielded by the communist party, and achieved with the assistance of the Red Army and the NKVD and underneath the "umbrella" held by Stalin in international politics, as a particularly humiliating and painful situation signifying the loss of state independence.

Initially, hopes for changes gave rise to armed resistance. After the falsification of the elections held in January 1947, such hopes were shattered, and Polish society entered the phase of adaptation to the new situation, a process rendered dramatically more profound by the "grinding mills" of Stalinist terror. Fear became a universal phenomenon, by no means surprising, if we take into consideration the fact that at least over 10 000 people were killed or executed, and hundreds of thousands were arrested, imprisoned or sentenced to labour camps. Contrary to expectations, terror did not diminish after the dispersal of the legal and armed opposition. Prisons and camps were filled with peasants who defended their crops, workers employed in factories, which experienced breakdowns, engineers held "responsible" for the non-accomplishment of plans, and listeners of foreign radio broadcasts. In 1952, the number of political and "political" prisoners totalled almost 50,000.

Adaptation was based not solely on fear and the feeling of abandonment by the West, which had "sold" Poland in Yalta. Great significance was attached to profound social changes, which assumed the form of a "revolution at the top": the division of landed estates among peasants, the nationalisation of industry, banks and commerce, and the seizure of tenement houses from their former owners. Mass-scale social promotion followed: people regarded as of "low" class status now enjoyed access to posts in the state and party apparatus and the boards of nationalised enterprises. The celebrated slogan: "you may become an officer on the merit of earnest willingness, and not education" pertained also to other intelligentsia professions. The industrialisation programme, and particularly the construction of the heavy industry, were initiated with enormous impetus, stimulated by growing international tension. Hundreds of thousands of jobs were made available to the rural poor. Fear of unemployment and hunger disappeared. An important legitimising factor was the myth of the former German Recovered Territories, whose annexation was treated as an expression of historical justice and reprisal upon the "eternal foe". The affiliation of those terrains to Poland was guaranteed by the Soviet Union; in other words, they would be lost once again without the Polish communists. This myth was even more powerful since one of the most avidly guarded taboos was memory about lands lost in the east and Stalinist crimes, symbolised by the Katyń Massacre. An increasingly universal conviction claimed that Poland had entered a path of rapid modernisation, and that it was turning into an industrial and urban country, thus liquidating "centuries-old backwardness" and "catching up with Europe". In addition, it was maintained that those processes were accompanied by full respect for the principles of social equality and justice. This conviction was reinforced by omnipresent propaganda, which skillfully incorporated the whole of culture, including poetry and music. The force of the ensuing impact was intensified by the fact that numerous propaganda motifs referred to traditional folk stereotypes, such as the condemnation of the "idlers", the "bourgeois", the "kulaks" or the "profiteers". At the same time, "heavy manual labourers", Stakhanovites (male and female), innovators, and members of the kolkhozy , were glorified. The Poles grew accustomed to the system, and even those adverse to communism found social niches. The modest, but universally accessible services provided by the "welfare state": free-of-charge medical care and education, cheap vacations and low rent, were duly appreciated. Creative people benefited from special treatment and enjoyed numerous privileges. Boles law Bierut, the communist leader, devoid of any traces of a personality and resembling a low-ranking postal civil servant, had a penchant for playing host to men of letters, poets, painters or professors.

The situation recalled that prevailing in other countries dominated by the Soviet Union, and ruled by the communists. On the other hand, differences abounded. By way of example, the Polish authorities launched a rather late attack against the Catholic Church - the imprisonment of Primate Wyszyński took place in September 1953, i. e. already after the death of Stalin. State symbols remained unchanged - even the mediaeval white eagle was retained; deprived of the crown, it nonetheless did not display a red star. References to national tradition were frequent; naturally, such fragments of the past, which could be acknowledged as "progressive" (the Enlightenment as opposed to Romanticism, Positivism versus Modernism, etc.) were recalled more frequently.

In 1956, it appeared that this entire construction would collapse, and that the twelve year-long nightmare would prove to be a mere episode. In Poland, the post-Stalinist thaw assumed a specific form, stemming probably from local tradition, including strong attachment to independence and the anti-Soviet stand, although a unique role was played also by chance. Bierut, the "Father of the Nation", died in March 1956, during the aftermath of the famous Twentieth Party Congress, and de-Stalinisation was accelerated and rendered more profound by the struggle for succession waged within the communist elite. The workers‘ rebellion, which broke out in Poznań (28 June 1956), and was ultimately put down to the accompaniment of bloodshed, proved to be a stimulating factor. It was recognised not only as an additional impulse to the "war at the top", but, as in the case of Polish national insurrections during the nineteenth century or the Warsaw Uprising, it became part of national mythology. The emergent myth, expressed by one of the slogans resounding in the streets of Poznań, depicted the workers ready to embark upon a struggle for "bread and freedom", waged in the name of society as a whole.

The ultimate solution of the social conflict took place in October. In truly dramatic circumstances, when the Kremlin Political Bureau arrived in Warsaw almost in corpore and Red Army tanks set off for the Polish capital, Władysław Gomułka, a communist leader, but also a recent (1951-1954) political prisoner, enjoying the renown of a person who dared to oppose Stalin, became the new head of the party. When many tension-filled hours later Khrushchev returned to Moscow, and the tanks withdrew to the garrisons, Gomułka became a national hero. He was aided greatly by the discovery of a modus vivendi with the powerful Catholic Church, headed by Primate Wyszyński, also a former political prisoner, and a firm, but moderate politician.

Nevertheless, Gomułka was not the man whom the Poles considered (or wished) him to be. He rapidly achieved stability in the country, preserving all the fundamental elements of the system: a party with a monopoly of power; central management of the state-owned economy; control over social and cultural life; and an ideological, economic and military union with Big Brother. The culmination of the process of de-Stalinisation yielded a new variant of the communist state, often described as "real socialism". Although the conviction about a worldwide victory of socialism was not rejected, ideological utopia was put aside. Mass-scale terror and total subjugation were no longer necessary. An overwhelming part of society was of the opinion that the existing state of things had become indelible once and for all: just as the Sun rises in the east, and the Vistula flows northwards, so Poland is socialist. The Gomułka brand of socialism may have been unlovable, but one could manage to live in it.

At any rate, this was the situation during the first post-October years: a certain breath of freedom was discerned both in personal contacts with abroad (almost every Polish family had a relative or an acquaintance in the free world), and in American or French books and films; religion, relegated during the Stalinist era, returned to schools; small stores and artisan workshops were revived; the peasants abandoned collective farms and were able to sell their produce at local markets; real incomes grew and shops were supplied better than at any time since 1939. There appeared films by Wajda and Munk, compositions by Penderecki and Lutosławski, plays by Mrożek and novels by Andrzejewski, while books by Miłosz and Gombrowicz, issued by emigré publishing houses, were illegally, but systematically, available. Even Polish sportsmen seemed to be more successful - a source of joy for authorities and fans alike, and a balm for the national pride of both.

Owing to the fact that the Gomułka team continued to adhere to a model of centralised economy, aimed at an expansion of the heavy and energy industries, the 1970s ended with a catastrophe. An unanticipated price rise produced a reaction similar to the one which took place in June 1976. This time, the strikes were held by the workers of Gdańsk and Szczecin, towns which became the site of riots, the deployment of the army and, consequently, the death of several score persons. The party, headed by Edward Gierek, managed to seize control of the situation at the cost of ousting Gomułka. Once again, a compromise was made with the Church, and society was proposed a "new economic policy", focused on individual consumption and the modernisation of industry upon the basis of Western credits. The continuation of old models of management and ownership condemned this suggestion to failure. The latter would have never become so spectacular if not for the fact that an organized opposition emerged in the 1970s, and that in 1978 Cardinal Karol Wojtyła was elected Pope - an event unexpected both for Poland, the world and himself. The first papal visit to Poland denoted a great triumph not only for the Church, but for all those who strove towards freedom. Kneeling before the Pope, the Poles raised their heads against the rulers. Moreover, members of the opposition found a path towards the workers. Although this was but a narrow track, it proved highly useful at a time when the workers experienced the range of the crisis affecting the country. In July 1980, a tide of strikes, organised in response to price rises, swept across Poland. This time, the striking workers did not march towards party headquarters - a move which previously ended with disturbances and the use of firearms - but organised sit-ins in their factories. Don't set fire to the committees - establish your own", adjoined Jacek Kuroń, one of the leaders of the opposition. This is precisely what took place: from the middle of August, one factory after another ceased working. Almost everywhere, assistance was rendered by members of the opposition, who noted down demands, printed leaflets, and supplied information to foreign journalists. Ultimately, on 31 August, an agreement was signed in Gdańsk. Already the very fact that the authorities were compelled to negotiate with a strike committee was extraordinary. Even more significant was that the prime postulate called for the creation of "self-governing and independent trade unions". This was the origin of "Solidarity" - the first mass-scale organisation outside communist control since 1947. Several weeks later, the number of union members totalled 9 million. The strike produced also a charismatic leader - Lech Wałesa, the not quite 40 year-old electrician from the Lenin Shipyards. The myth born in the streets of Poznań in 1956 was completed.

Although only a few predicted such a turn of events, Poland initiated its march towards democracy and independence. This process was to last for another ten years, and was full of dramatic and even tragic moments, since the communist party, under the new leadership of General Wojciech Jaruzelski, tenaciously defended its position and the "accomplishments of socialism". It could be argued at length whether the appearance of "Solidarity" was an embryo or a symptom of the inefficacy of the system. Apparently, both theses are true: the emergence of a mass-scale protest movement disclosed the weaknesses of communism, and primarily destroyed its legitimisation as a system which guarantees progress, prosperity and the rule of the people. The communists themselves lacked ideological ardour. This is the reason why neither the proclamation of martial law (13 December 1981) nor the detention of more than 10 000 people, brutal pacifications, or even assassinations were an effective remedy. On the contrary, they generated extremely strong polarisation, which up to this very day delineates the political climate, and created a truly alternative, albeit semi-conspiracy political, social and cultural life. More than 2 000 illegal newspapers and the same number of books (including tens of reprints of emigré publications) were issued. Churches organised innumerable exhibitions and theatrical spectacles, and underground radio stations transmitted programmes. It seemed that Poland had become split into two parts.

The dominating conviction, expressed by the delegalized "Solidarity", maintained that it was necessary to negotiate a "new social contract" with the communists, a policy to which Wałesa was obligated by his title of a laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize (1983). The Jaruzelski team, on the other hand, increasingly strongly expressed the opinion that a solution to the crisis would not be ensured by economic reforms alone, even if they were to be far-reaching, but by political compromise with the opponent. In this situation, the Gorbachev-inspired perestroika proved to be a catalyst: the opposition stopped fearing the Soviet tanks (although Polish ones still loomed!) and the communists were encouraged to pursue changes. The ultimate impulse came in the summer of 1988, when Poland became the scene of a wave of strikes, the largest since December 1981, whose prime slogan declared: "There is no freedom without Solidarity". Jaruzelski agreed to initiate talks, albeit not without dramatic hesitation. The initiative, however, was seized by "Solidarity", and only briefly did the communists enjoy the compromise signed at the Round Table (6 February - 5 April 1989). The partly democratic elections of 4 June assumed the form of a plebiscite, in which the party and Jaruzelski suffered shameful defeat.

Instead of pursuing reforms, Poland now entered a path of total systemic change. True, in his capacity as the new President - elected with a majority of a single vote! - Jaruzelski was to guarantee the evolutionary nature of the transformations, but the formation of the Tadeusz Mazowiecki government (12 September), in which the communists were dominated by members of "Solidarity", turned out to be a stone that set into motion an avalanche of changes in the whole of Central Europe. In this part of the world, communism was turning into a fragment of the distant past.

In accordance with the Constitution, Poland became a "democratic state ruled by the law and implementing the principles of social justice". Furthermore, she initiated progression towards the European Union and NATO, a process, both complicated and, for a large number of the Poles, distressing, that lasts up to this day. An opening to the world revealed that a great section of the economy was archaic and incapable of facing competition, and the majority of the society - insufficiently educated and unaccustomed to taking risks. True, shop shelves were filled rapidly and total freedom of opinions, including extreme ones, reigned, but the monster of unemployment, absent for the past fifty years, reared its head, accompanied by a feeling of social insecurity, while the span of incomes grew more marked than during the ancien régime. Despite the passage of time, the attitude towards the communist past is one of the most vivid demarcation lines both among political elites and within public opinion, and former heroes - Jaruzelski and Wałesa - still exert an impact upon the political scene, although in different ways. A society which for decades lived in conditions of imposed uniformity, and then engaged itself in the creation of a "divided country", finds it difficult to discover its place in pluralism, which many associate with chaos. It bears the burden not only of the "phantoms", but also of certain patterns from the recent past. This is the reason why upon numerous occasions normal conflicts of interest are expressed in forms identical to those dating from the period of the struggle waged for freedom and independence - strikers wear white-and-red arm-bands, as if they were to man barricades. The trade unions, particularly "Solidarity", play a role much greater than in the other countries which have also forsaken the communist mirage.

Although such conflicts are no mere stage setting, Poland continues to change at a swift rate; this time, everything seems to indicate that she has found herself on a road to a modern, productive economy, focused on human needs. Despite multiple turnabouts, democracy appears to be stable, and until now nothing has disturbed the rhythm of the handing over of power to the opposition after its election victory, as was the case in 1993, when the elections were won by the post-communists, and in 1997, a year marked by a victory of the right wing. Xenophobic reactions and hostility towards integration with the West do not exceed the European norm.

During the twentieth century, now nearing its end, the Poles experienced magnificent triumphs and humiliating defeats; as is the rule, their collective life combined greatness and baseness, heroism and treachery. Nothing indicates that the coming century will be easy, if only because the burden of the recent past and the present, which Poland carries together with the rest of the world, remains onerous. Hopefully, the experiences of the epoch of totalitarianism will make it possible to avoid a new servility of nations and people, including Poland and the Poles.